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The historically constructed nature of ethnicity has become a widely accepted paradigm in the social sciences. Scholars have espe-
cially have focused on the ways modern states have been able to create and change ethnic identities, with perhaps the strongest case
studies coming from colonial Africa, where the gap between strong states and weak societies has been most apparent. I suggest,
however, that in order to better understand how and when ethnic change occurs it is important to examine case studies where
state-directed ethnic change has failed. To rectify this oversight I examine the case of the “lost counties” of Uganda, which were
transferred from the Bunyoro kingdom to the Buganda kingdom at the onset of colonial rule. I show that British attempts to assim-
ilate the Banyoro residents in two of the lost counties were an unmitigated failure, while attempts in the other five counties were
successful. I claim that the reason for these differing outcomes lies in the status of the two lost counties as part of the historic Bunyoro
homeland, whereas the other five counties were both geographically and symbolically peripheral to Bunyoro.The evidence here thus
suggests that varying ethnic attachments to territory can lead to differing outcomes in situations of state-directed assimilation and
ethnic change.
T he historically constructed nature of ethnicity hasbecome a widely accepted paradigm in the socialsciences over the past several decades. As a result of
the backlash against the formerly dominant primordialist
paradigm, whereby ethnic groups were deemed to be
ancient and unchanging, it is now posited that ethnicity
can be created and shaped by economic or political insti-
tutions. This argument—whose advocates are usually
grouped under the term “constructivism”—has been elu-
cidated in a variety of contexts.1
This shift has resulted in a large amount of recent
research into how and when states have been able to cre-
ate, shape and even eliminate ethnic and national groups.
Much focus has been given to the process of state-directed
assimilation of ethnic minorities and immigrants into a
dominant majority national culture.2 Yet, considering the
long history of social bonds outside the realms of the state
in the western world, many scholars have disputed the
ability of modern states like the U.S. and France to enforce
assimilation of its ethnic and immigrant minorities.3 If,
then, the goal of this constructivist shift in the study of
ethnicity is to investigate how and when political phenom-
ena affect ethnic identity, it is not clear that western nation-
states are ideal case studies. Rather, one would need to
find both strong states, with autonomy from civil society
and the bureaucratic means to carry out social projects,
and weak societies unable to counter the effects of these
states. Indeed, as suggested by James Scott in his analysis
of modern statehood, the most severe state-initiated social
engineering requires both an authoritarian state “willing
and able to use the full weight of its coercive power” and
“a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist
these plans.”4
In this sense it may be that the African colonial state
can provide such a best case scenario for the study of
state-directed ethnic change for two reasons. First, colo-
nial states held modern authoritarian bureaucratic power
autonomous from those Africans over whom they ruled.
In the extreme way they were organized for the purpose of
extraction and repression, African colonial states were pos-
sibly more similar in their absolutism to the ancient regime
of France than contemporary European governments or
previous colonial states in the Americas or Asia.5 Second,
as African pre-colonial societies were characterized by low
population densities, fragile indigenous states, and ethni-
cally diverse populations, they would have been in a
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uniquely frail position to resist the power of the colonial
state to effect ethnic change and assimilation. Moreover,
the effect of colonization itself, especially through war and
the arbitrary creation of boundaries cutting across soci-
eties, weakened much of what existed of pre-colonial civil
society. Thus the gap between this strong colonial state,
which Crawford Young calls “the purest modern form of
autonomous bureaucratic autocracy,”6 and the frag-
mented and weak societies across the continent means
that the African colonial state is an ideal case study for
state-directed social change.
As expected, a variety of scholars have taken up this
research challenge, noting the ways colonial states created,
shaped, and changed ethnic identities in Africa.7 Through
the drawing of colonial boundaries and the help of admin-
istrators and missionaries, the African colonial state was
able to delineate new ethnic groups, amalgamate others,
and even, in the case of the Herero of German South-
West Africa, come close to eliminating at least one ethnic
group in an early example of modern genocide.8 Indeed,
even those who have claimed the African colonial state to
be much weaker than is normally claimed still agree that it
was able to shape ethnic identities in quite profound ways.9
Yet much of this recent research on ethnicity and the
African colonial state has suffered from a problem of selec-
tion bias. More specifically, constructivists have tended to
contrast those ethnic groups invented by colonialists with
those that already existed and thus did not need to be
invented. What is missing in this account is an investiga-
tion into instances of ethnic groups that colonialists
attempted but failed to invent, which would provide us
with means to understand the limits to state-directed eth-
nic change. If no such examples exist or can be explained
away as exceptional, then we should be able to confirm
the proposition that modern nation-states are indeed able
to shape local ethnic identities in a profound way. How-
ever, if we can find an anomaly of failed assimilation in
what should be a best or “crucial case” scenario for the
study of state-led ethnic change, then we would better
understand how and why ethnic change does not occur.10
To rectify this oversight, in this essay I examine the case
of the so-called “Lost Counties” of Uganda, which British
officials transferred from the Bunyoro kingdom to the
Buganda kingdom at the onset of colonial rule. I show
that attempts to assimilate the Banyoro residents of two of
the five lost counties, Buyaga and Bugangaizi, into Bugan-
dan society over the colonial period were an unmitigated
failure, a fact most evident in the overwhelming vote for
secession from Buganda in a 1964 referendum in the two
counties. However, the Ugandan colonial state was much
more successful at assimilating residents of the other five
lost counties, inasmuch as there has been neither a demand
for a referendum on secession from Buganda nor any indi-
cation in census records or popular politics that these res-
idents continue to define themselves as Banyoro. I claim
that the reason why the colonial state was unable to pro-
mote assimilation of the Banyoro of Buyaga and Bugan-
gaizi into Buganda was due to the pre-colonial status of
Buyaga and Bugangaizi as part of the core Bunyoro “home-
land” and the subsequent strong ethnic attachment to the
two counties; the colonial state was more successful in the
other lost counties because of their lack of homeland sta-
tus. This evidence thereby demonstrates that the presence
or absence of homelands and the resulting varying inten-
sity of pre-existing ethnic identities can explain the differ-
ing abilities of states to assimilate ethnic groups. As such,
the case of the lost counties suggests that even the stron-
gest of states are limited in their ability to alter strongly-
held identities with territorial roots, a lesson that has
implications for assimilation policies in the modern world.
This article is structured as follows. I examine construc-
tivist theories of ethnic change in relation to colonial Africa.
I then show in how the colonial administration in the lost
counties encouraged assimilation and ethnic change
through a variety of means but nonetheless failed in its
efforts. The reason for this failure, I argue, lies in the
pre-colonial history of the lost counties. Finally, I con-
clude by suggesting implications of the article as regards
the relationship between the modern state and ethnicity.
On the Colonial Creation of Ethnicity
Up until around 1970, the primordialist paradigm of eth-
nicity held dominance among academics, colonial officials,
and others. This thesis held that Africans were all members
of “tribes,” which had existed since ancient times in an
unchanged state. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, anthro-
pologists took the lead in suggesting that “tribes”—which
they suggested should henceforth be known as “ethnic
groups,” as they were elsewhere in the world—were in fact
of modern origin.11 Over the next three decades many schol-
ars developed the argument that ethnic groups were more
specifically of colonial origin and that they were constructed
or invented during colonial rule through a variety of means,
including mapping regions and the work of missionaries,
local colonial officials and anthropologists.12
The most powerful critique of colonial practice has come
from those scholars who have argued that the colonial state
itself had the largest influence in (re)creating and inventing
ethnic groups.13 This process lay in the belief among the
colonial powers that Africans naturally lived in “tribes,” each
complete with its own homeland, culture, language and
political institutions. Due in part to the ideology of nation-
alismthen sweepingEurope, colonialists often idealized these
pre-colonial “tribes” and set out to perpetuate their politi-
cal institutions through the policy of indirect rule as a means
to preserve them against the onslaught of modernity. Thus
colonialists set up a system of local political units which,
ideally, were ethnically homogenous and ruled by “tribal
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existed alongside the economic imperative of running col-
onies on the cheap, which meant that colonial powers were
often led to create new languages, new political and legal
institutions, new “invented traditions” and, in effect, new
ethnic groups altogether in order to better administer their
new territories.
Over the course of colonial rule Africans legitimated
these new ethnic identities in two ways. First, politics in
rural areas was structured through these local “tribal” units,
thereby leading Africans to mobilize politically along eth-
nic rather than national lines. Second, in responding to
the uncertainties and moral crises of colonialism and
modernity more generally, Africans sought refuge and
found meaning in ethnicity.14 Thus, by the end of colo-
nialism, the new ethnic entities created at its onset had
not only taken hold but had become perhaps the most
important source of social cleavage in Africa.
This argument has gained much weight within the field
of African studies, leading Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal
Daloz to write that “there is now ample evidence of what
has been called the ‘invention of ethnicity,’ by which is
meant the ways in which it was constructed and instru-
mentalized during the colonial period.”15 Yet some schol-
ars as have attempted to balance out this analysis with a
more nuanced approach, arguing that invention was a
matter of degree, since, while some ethnic groups were
invented under colonialism, many other ethnic groups
could trace their continuity back to the pre-colonial era.
For instance, Crawford Young contrasts the Baganda and
Banyoro, “whose political identity readily translated into
ethnic ideology,” with other Ugandan “novel ethnic enti-
ties” like the Acholi, Bagisu, and Bakiga.16
In other words, for the purposes of colonial adminis-
tration some—in fact, most—ethnic groups needed to be
invented while others like the Baganda and Banyoro did
not, and the roles of the administrative “chiefs” in the
latter case could be adapted from pre-colonial times rather
than invented out of thin air. As a result, many scholars
would agree with Chabal and Daloz that “some ethnic
groups were more creatively invented during colonial rule
than others,”17 and their task is to elucidate the nature
and extent of this invention. Yet, as we are about to see,
this paradigm fails to account for the varied outcomes of
Uganda’s lost counties, where the colonial state was unable
to promote assimilation along the lines suggested by
constructivism.
How the Lost Counties Were Lost
When the first European explorers arrived in the 1860s in
what is now Uganda, the kingdom of Buganda was at the
height of its political powers over neighboring kingdoms
on the north shore of Lake Victoria. To its north was the
formerly powerful kingdom of Bunyoro, which had once
controlled large sections of what is now southern and south-
west Uganda but had been declining in regional power
and influence since the seventeenth century. After a highly
tumultuous period in the 1880s whereby roughly equal
halves of the Bugandan population were converted to Prot-
estantism and Catholicism, the British were able to sign a
treaty with the Kabaka (king) of Buganda and then use
Buganda as a base for extending their rule throughout the
surrounding area. Colonel Henry Colivile was assigned in
1893 to take control of the Nile basin north of Buganda,
which inevitably led to clashes with the obstinate Kaba-
lega, the Omukama (king) of Bunyoro, whose troops Coliv-
ile pushed back to north of the Kafu river before conquering
the kingdom altogether. This war of pacification was
extremely bloody: while the full scale of the violence is
unclear, it is certain that it led to the deaths or forced
migration of a large majority of the kingdom’s subjects, a
demographic collapse from which the Banyoro did not
recover for more than a half-century.18
Before ending his tour of duty in 1894, Colonel Coliv-
ile promised conquered territory south of the Kafu River
to Bugandan chiefs (refer to map 1). Colvile’s successor,
EJL Berkeley wrote that
The annexed provinces in becoming part of the Kingdom of
Uganda, must, of course recognize the sovereignty of the King of
Uganda, the supremacy and authority of the chiefs selected (with
the approval of Her Majesty’s Commissioner) to govern them,
and they must understand that henceforth they are subject to all
laws, regulations, obligations as to local taxation and tribute, etc.
that are in force in the other parts of the Kingdom. At the same
time, however, that these provinces became part of the Kingdom
of Uganda so would their native inhabitants become Waganda,
and, as such, entitled to all the public and private rights of
Waganda in any other part of the Kingdom.19
In other words, Berkeley did not see a reason why those
inhabitants of the region who had survived the pacifica-
tion war would not assimilate into Buganda as they were
governed by Bugandan chiefs and laws. Thus Berkeley’s
conception that the resident Banyoro would “become
Waganda” because they were now part of the Buganda
kingdom corresponds exactly to the constructivist para-
digm of ethnicity conforming to colonial administrative
boundaries rather than the other way around.
Despite the fact that resistance to the transfer began
immediately, Berkeley’s successors nonetheless accepted the
annexation as final. It did not matter that only later, after
the lost counties had been incorporated into Mubende
district, did the British find out that the lost counties
hosted all the tombs of all former Abakama (kings) of
Bunyoro, for which they allowed the Bunyoro Native Gov-
ernment to appoint a special salaried chief (the Mugema)
to reside in Buganda and look after the tombs in 1915.
Indeed, the British continued to ignore the nine formal
requests of various Abakama to have the matter investi-
gated between 1931 and 1958, while similarly denying
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a local political group formed in 1921, to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies in 1951, 1953, and 1955 and the
request of the Legislative Council member for Bunyoro,
GBK Magezi, in 1955. Repeatedly British officials claimed
that, in the words of Governor Frederick Crawford in
1957, “nothing can be done about that now,” or, in the
words of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1931,
“it is a long time [since the lost counties were incorpo-
rated into Buganda] and this matter was settled during
the time of fighting, so we cannot now do anything fur-
ther in the matter.”20 The multiple pleas by the Banyoro
petitioners exasperated British officials like Chief Secre-
tary C.H. Hartwell, who in 1955 stated that “in a matter
of this kind there must be some finality, and in this case it
must be accepted that the final decision has been taken.”21
There is no doubt that the British were content to have
the issue of the lost counties disappear through the assim-
ilation of the resident Banyoro, a point admitted by Gov-
ernor Crawford when he wrote that “there is some evidence
that deliberate attempts were made to assimilate the
Banyoro in the ‘lost counties’ and that in the 1930s these
attempts were encouraged by the Protectorate Govern-
ment.”22 One must assume that Crawford was referring
to the recommendation by the District Commissioner of
Mubende in the 1930s that, due to “sporadic unrest” that
troubled Buyaga and Bugangaizi “throughout the colonial
period,” the Mugema should be removed “on the ground
that he represented the opinion of only a small fraction of
the Banyoro.”23
Yet this strategy of assimilation was by no means lim-
ited to the 1930s, nor was it limited to exerting influence
over the Buganda kingdom officials who governed the lost
counties. Indeed, the Buganda kingdom government,
which had existed in pre-colonial times but whose powers
to enforce “tribal customs” were greatly increased by the
British, used a variety of means to promote assimilation in
the lost counties. For instance, a representative from the
area to the Uganda Constitutional Conference in 1961
claimed that, “if the Banyoro do anything in a way differ-
ent from that practiced by Baganda, they are liable to be
Map 1
Areas (in grey) transferred to Buganda in 1893
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prosecuted for breach of Kiganda customary law,” includ-
ing barring “the inhabitants of the lost counties from danc-
ing and singing in their traditional Kinyoro style.”24 In
his petition to the British government on the issue
Omukama Tito Winyi also noted that in the lost counties
“dancing in the Kinyoro style is illegal, and all dancing
must be in the Kiganda style, which is foreign to the
Banyoro people.”25
Attempts to assimilate the Banyoro in the lost counties
hardly stopped at the dancehall doors. More generally, in
a classic assimilationist strategy,26 the Buganda Kingdom
government both created incentives for assimilation and,
perhaps more importantly, failed to discriminate against
resident Banyoro along ethnic lines. In this sense it is clear
that local Banyoro were not treated as badly as some Bun-
yoro kingdom officials claimed:27 as Governor Crawford
noted,
it is a matter of opinion whether the Baganda have deliberately
attempted to keep the Banyoro in a state of inferiority and to
eliminate Kinyoro customs and the Lunyoro language. The
Baganda definitely look upon the inhabitants of the county as
Baganda or potential Baganda, and would see no reason why
they should be treated as a tribal minority.28
One assimilative strategy in the lost counties was the
uniform use of Luganda and not Lunyoro as an official
language, a fact noted by the MBC in 1960: “the suppres-
sion of our mother tongue, Lunyoro, hurts us beyond
imagination. Our children are taught in a foreign lan-
guage in the very first years of their education, and . . . our
language has been banned in Court, Offices, Churches in
addition to Schools.”29 Yet colonial officials neither saw a
need to set up Lunyoro-language schools nor did they feel
that the native Banyoro should have a problem learning
Luganda. For instance, Governor Crawford claimed that
“Luganda And Lunyoro are both Bantu languages with
great similarities. . . A Munyoro [singular of Banyoro] liv-
ing in Buganda has very little difficulty in learning to
speak Luganda fluently.”30 The Molson Commission,
whose job it was to recommend a resolution to the dis-
pute over the lost counties before Ugandan indepen-
dence, agreed, noting that
our impression is that the majority of Banyoro have little prac-
tical difficulty with Luganda. We regard the question of language
as essentially a political issue of a kind common in many coun-
tries. From a purely administrative point of view, it is natural
and reasonable that the Kabaka’s Government should insist on
the use of a single language throughout its administrative, judi-
cial and educational systems.31
As a result, British officials did not see a problem in either
forcing Banyoro to speak, read, and write Luganda or
even register themselves as with Bugandan names. Omu-
kama Winyi complained that “when the Banyoro go to
register births at the Gombolola [sub-county] offices, they
are compelled to enter in the register a Luganda name for
the child, and to register his clan according to the Kiganda
clan system and not the Kinyoro system.”32 Again, the
Molson Commission noted
it is understandable that the Kabaka’s Government should per-
suade and encourage alien tribesmen living in Buganda to regard
themselves as Baganda. The use of Baganda names would be a
natural outcome of this policy; and indeed, such a policy was
positively encouraged by Mr. Berkeley, the then Commissioner
of Uganda, as early as 1896.33
Going so far to even call this policy a “legitimate attempt
by the Buganda authorities at assimilation,” the Molson
Commission suggested that the reason some Banyoro
changed their names to Bugandan ones was “either because
they have come to regard themselves as Baganda, or because
they feel that the path of life will be easier for doing so.”34
The assumption that Banyoro would have an easier “path
of life” with a Bugandan name also applied to Buganda
kingdom government university scholarships. After a trip
to the region in 1957 the British MP Eirene White com-
plained that the only way for a resident Munyoro to get a
university scholarship is “to declare that he is a Bagan-
da,”35 a point repeated by Omukama Winyi in his claim
that only “pure Baganda” could be considered for a Buganda
bursary or scholarship. “If an applicant for such a schol-
arship states on his application form that he is a member
of any tribe other than the Baganda, his application is not
even considered.”36
As with forcing Banyoro to register themselves with
Luganda-language names, such a strategy of only allowing
Baganda to receive university scholarships created signifi-
cant incentives for Banyoro to self-identify as Baganda.
Simultaneously, however, there is little evidence that
Banyoro suffered severely from a lack of education that
would have prevented them from competing with other
residents of Baganda for jobs and scholarships. While sta-
tistics do not exist for the general well-being of the Banyoro
in the lost counties, we can take the population of Mubende
district, 70.0 percent of whom were registered as Banyoro
in the 1948 Census,37 as a proxy for the treatment of
Banyoro in Buganda. In doing so we can see the lack of
any overt discrimination: indeed, according to Governor
Crawford “the percentage of places available in primary
schools in relation to child population [in 1959] is higher
in Mubende District (57.4) than that in Buganda as a
whole (51.9)” and the Protectorate (49.3).38 Similarly, by
1959 the percentage of men in Mubende district who had
attended school at some point was, at 47.9 percent, higher
than in East Mengo (44.4 percent) or Masaka (42.9 per-
cent) districts, an impressive achievement considering that
men over 45 in Mubende had the lowest schooling rates
in Buganda. While the percentage of women in Mubende
who had attended school was the lowest among the four
districts, as indicated in table 1 the gap between Mubende
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those educated in the 1920s to 1.4 to 1 by the 1950s. This
should be seen as a considerable achievement if one recalls
that Mubende district was cut off from both railroad and
lake transportation and that the population density in
Mubende was only 37.1 people per square mile in 1959,
far below that of the Bugandan average of 113.7 and even
less than the average of 38.9 in the North.39
Finally, with the exception of the initial colonial period
there is little evidence that the Banyoro in the lost coun-
ties were poorly treated in comparison to other inhabit-
ants in similarly outlying areas of Buganda or even in
regards to residents of Buganda as a whole; in this sense it
would have been difficult to support an anti-Buganda cam-
paign in the lost counties on the basis of unequal treat-
ment. From 1929 through 1951 the poll tax in Mubende
district was only 10 Ush per person, as compared to 15
Ush elsewhere in Buganda and 18 Ush in nearby Lango.40
Furthermore, residents of the lost counties were relatively
healthy compared to the rest of the population: there were
three times more hospital beds and twice as many medical
staff per 100,000 residents at government hospitals in
Mubende than in West Mengo, and Buyaga and Bugan-
gaizi did not, unlike other counties in Buganda, suffer
from any tsetse fly problems. Similarly, as regards efforts
to eliminate leprosy, the Government of Buganda noted
that “much progress and most satisfactory results have
been achieved in Mubende district, that there is much to
be done in Mengo district and that in Masaka district we
have almost to start from scratch.”41
When discrimination did take place, however, Banyoro
could rely upon relatively equal and fair treatment by the
Bugandan government. As one British government com-
mission noted, “we were constantly told of a woman who
had been fined for speaking the language of Bunyoro in
court, but the complainants never mentioned that the
conviction was reversed on appeal by the Principal Court
of Buganda.”42 Similarly, the most-cited example of sup-
posed discrimination against the Banyoro—namely that
their land was taken away from them in the 1900 Agree-
ment between the British and Bugandan government and
given to absentee Bugandan landlords, leaving them with
only 70 of the 2995 square miles in the two counties43—
appears less egregious when one considers that the Agree-
ment “dispossessed in equal measure the majority of the
Baganda peasantry of their occupancy rights. . . The jus-
tification for the 1900 Land Settlement may be debatable,
but we are satisfied that it was applied uniformly to Baganda
and Banyoro.”44 The same qualification goes for the total
lack of any Banyoro appointed as county chiefs for the
two lost counties over the whole colonial period, as county
chiefs were almost always appointed from among the land-
holding elite,45 while the Banyoro as a whole in Buganda
were nonetheless overrepresented among government
employees.46
Explaining Ethnicity in the Lost
Counties
Despite these various attempts at assimilating the Banyoro
into Buganda, towards the end of colonial rule British
officials like Governor Crawford had begun to admit that
these efforts had “not, however, met with any conspicuous
success.”47 Yet the question remains as to why indigenous
Banyoro in Buyaga and Bugangaizi failed to assimilate
into Buganda when the Buganda kingdom was able to
assimilate non-Baganda at other times and in other places.
In pre-colonial times the Buganda kingdom had been quite
capable of assimilating conquered peoples, including the
residents of southern area of Buddu (comprising the con-
temporary district of Masaka; refer to map 1). After
Buganda invaded the area sometime around 1800, the
Buddu residents were assimilated to the point where, after
four generations at the most, they spoke Luganda without
a trace of Lunyoro or even a regional dialect.48
The Baganda were well known for their ability to assim-
ilate other peoples in the colonial period as well, most
obviously in the case of the numerous Banyarwanda who
migrated from Rwanda from the 1920s through the 1950s.
This population, which was largely Hutu and was thus
better able to fit into the “agrarian cultural context” of
Table 1
Percentages of the population of Buganda in 1959 who had ever attended school,
by age
Male Female
6–15 16–45 Over 45 6–15 16–45 Over 45
West Mengo 65.9 61.7 36.7 57.7 46.5 13.9
East Mengo 55.8 46.9 26.8 45.7 32.5 8.2
Mubende 58.9 54.6 19.1 40.2 22.2 1.2
Masaka 51.3 46.9 23.0 43.6 28.4 3.8
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Buganda, “sought to become a part of the local society,
gradually assimilating, taking on local names, clan affilia-
tions, spouses and even an overall identity.”49 As a result
the Banyarwanda went from 5.9 percent of the Ugandan
population in 1959 to only 1.3 percent by 2002.
A similar phenomenon of assimilation took place among
other non-Baganda, including the Banyoro in the other
lost counties.50 As the Molson Commission noted, “in
Buwekula and in the areas to the east there are indications
that a number of Banyoro have been assimilated success-
fully by the Baganda,” as indicated by relatively high rates
of intermarriage between Banyoro and Baganda.51 While
the British were unequivocal in noting that the popula-
tion of Buruli and Bugerere counties were initially “entirely
made up of Banyoro” and “chiefly Banyoro,” respective-
ly,52 by the end of the colonial era neither Bugerere, Buruli
nor Buwekula had anything close to a majority Banyoro
population. Indeed, colonial census data shows both a
sharp fall in the percentage of Banyoro as well as a rise in
the number of Baganda recorded in the five counties
between 1921 and 1959 despite the documented migra-
tion of Baganda away from these border counties.53
This phenomenon is perhaps most obvious when one
notes the complete absence of any serious movement to be
reincorporated into Bunyoro in the other lost counties over
the past century, despite both the failure of the British to
grant any of the other counties a referendum along with
Buyaga and Bugangaizi and the persistent and ongoing
attempts of the Bunyoro kingdom and the MBC to return
all five counties to Bunyoro. Of these areas only the indig-
enous population of the district of Nakasongola, who largely
now call themselves members of the Baruli ethnic group,54
have had any hesitation in their loyalty to the Buganda
kingdom. Yet despite the claim that “Baruli are actually
Banyoro but they are mixed up,”55 there is little to no evi-
dence that any significant number of Baruli are interested
in returning to Bunyoro.56 This difference with Buyaga and
Bugangaizi—whichcomprisemodern-dayKibaaledistrict—
was most striking in the constitutional process of the early
1990s, when Ugandans had the opportunity to voice their
opinions about the future political structure of Uganda.
Of the official submissions from the former lost counties,
which had by then become five district governments, Kibaale
was the only one which expressed any dissatisfaction with
being part of a reconstituted Bugandan kingdom.57
Yet one possible response could be to claim that the
population changes were less a result of assimilation than
of migration flows, specifically the influx of Baganda and
foreign immigrants such as the Banyarwanda and Barundi,
who went from a negligible percentage of the Bugandan
population to 19.3 percent between 1921 and 1959, and
the outflow of Banyoro to other parts of Uganda. While it
is true that some Banyoro did migrate to neighboring
areas like Lango and Bunyoro itself,58 there is little evi-
dence that migration flows could fully account for such a
drastic change in the ethnic composition of the lost coun-
ties. Indeed, the percentage of Banyoro residents decreased
in other surrounding counties in Buganda and Busoga as
well as in Kampala between 1921 and 1959. Further-
more, as table 2 indicates, migrating groups of Ban-
yarwanda and Barundi largely avoided the lost counties,
as did neighboring groups like the Basoga (from the east)
and the Banyankole (from the west). Similarly, none of
the lost counties saw any significant influx of Baganda
during the colonial period, partially due to the climate in
the eastern lost counties being more suitable to cassava
and millet than to the plantain, the staple food of the
Bugandan diet, and also due to the counties’ geographical
remoteness from any major transportation hubs.59
Thus assimilation must account for at least some of the
disparate paths during the colonial period of Buyaga and
Bugangaizi on the one hand and the other lost counties
Table 2
Percentage of selected ethnic groups in the five lost counties
County Census Baganda Banyoro Banyankole Basoga Banyarwanda Barundi
Buruli 1921 12.3 86.5 0.1 0.5 * *
1959 60.1 2.2 13.2 0.2 1.8 0.3
Bugerere 1921 19.9 74.5 0.2 3.7 * *
1959 34.7 0.5 3.1 9.2 3.8 7.4
Buwekula 1921 41.6 60.4 1.7 0.0 * *
1959 56.6 13.1 9.7 0.0 5.7 0.5
Buyaga 1921 5.4 94.4 0.1 0.0 * *
1959 5.6 80.4 0.2 0.0 2.2 0.2
Bugangaizi 1921 10.2 89.6 0.0 0.0 * *
1959 19.2 75.6 0.2 0.9 2.0 0.3
*Not recorded in census data
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on the other. The most plausible explanation for this dif-
ference lies not, however, in any colonial policies, but rather
in the pre-colonial past. As with the Baganda, Ban-
yarwanda and other kingdom groups in the Great Lakes
region, the Banyoro ethnic group owes its existence to the
pre-colonial Bunyoro kingdom which had formerly dom-
inated the region. For most of the pre-colonial period
Buyaga and Bugangaizi lay at the heart of this kingdom,
inasmuch as these two counties held most of the tombs of
the former Abakama. These tombs would have been situ-
ated after a king’s death either near a site of great impor-
tance during his lifetime or near the royal house;60 along
with other sacred sites, these tombs, while not well kept,
were nonetheless considered important enough to be
marked on maps of the area and continued to hold a
significant amount of symbolic importance for the Banyoro
in the colonial period.61 Indeed, in his ethnographic field
work in the 1950s John Beattie noted that tombs were
considered “national shrines” and that all Banyoro with
whom he spoke “knew that Buyaga and Bugangaizi coun-
ties had been the centre of the traditional Nyoro king-
dom, and, despite their alienation, in an important sense
they still were.”62
However, the kingdom had only weak control over the
other five lost counties in the pre-colonial period. As
with the aforementioned case of Buddu, which was merely
“in the orbit of Bunyoro” and was thus “ineffectively
ruled,”63 the Bunyoro kingdom was in effective occupa-
tion of only some sections of the other five counties,
which were largely frontier lands.64 Specifically, while
Bugerere and other frontier counties may have techni-
cally been under the aegis of the Omukama, Beattie notes
that pre-colonial Bunyoro nonetheless suffered from a
lack of uniform government: “the more widely dispersed
Nyoro state was very much less evenly administered [than
Buganda, and] although in theory the Omukama’s power
was absolute, in day to day matters his authority declined
as one approached the peripheral areas of the king-
dom.”65 The long-standing frontier status of these coun-
ties explains why none of the Abakama from the late
seventeenth century onwards were buried there.66
In other words, what made these two areas different
was that Buyaga and Bugangaizi, with their sacred sites
and royal tombs, comprised part of the historic “home-
land” of Bunyoro, whereas the other counties were both
geographically and symbolically peripheral to Bunyoro.
For Anthony Smith, Monica Toft, and other scholars, a
homeland is a key part of ethnic identity, in that it ties
current generations of an ethnic group to older ones
through the collection of myths and memories connect-
ing the group’s ancestors and the territory in question.
This ethnic association with the territory, however, means
as well that “the land’s resources also become exclusive to
the people; they are not for ‘alien’ use and exploitation,”67
and that a key part of any legitimate claim to political
control over that territory is the idea that “a people with
deep roots and a historical attachment to the land have a
right to control it.”68
Whereas this “homeland principle” was formulated by
Smith and Toft in relation to nationalism rather than assim-
ilation, it goes a long way towards explaining the Ugan-
dan case study examined here. Inasmuch as Buyaga and
Bugangaizi was the pre-colonial homeland of the Banyoro
people, its Banyoro residents would have been much less
interested in assimilating into Buganda as doing so would
have involved negating a core part of their ethnic identity.
However, Banyoro residents in the other counties and in
Buddu, let alone the Banyarwanda immigrants to Uganda
mentioned above, did not have a strong ethnic attach-
ment to the land on which they lived and could therefore
assimilate more easily, safe in the knowledge that their
assimilation had not done any serious damage to the future
of their previous ethnic group. Thus this differing quality
of attachment to territory and ethnic identity explains the
very different rates of assimilation during the colonial
period, even though residents in all of the counties could
have been categorized as Banyoro at the onset of colonial
rule.
Conclusion
This article has suggested that the presence or absence of a
pre-colonial homeland explains why the Ugandan colo-
nial state failed to direct assimilation in Buyaga and Bugan-
gaizi but succeeded in the other five lost counties. If, as
demonstrated in the introduction, we take the Ugandan
and other African colonial states as “crucial case” studies
in the study of state-directed ethnic change, then we are
left with at least three implications as regards the relation-
ship between states and ethnic change. First, the evidence
presented here suggests that ethnic identities, whether in
Africa or elsewhere, vary significantly in their intensity
and that this variation can lead to varying outcomes when
states attempt to assimilate these groups. In contrast, in
many historical or contemporary studies of ethnicity and
nationalism, there is often an unfortunate assumption that
all ethnic and national identities are of the same order and
intensity. This fault originated in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, when colonial rulers saw them-
selves as belonging to one and only one nation and their
subjects as members of one and only one tribe, each of
which was assumed to have the same intensity of attach-
ment. Today, while the constructivist turn has led to the
understanding that people can and usually do hold mul-
tiple ethnic identities, it is not yet clear that there has been
enough attention given to the variation in the strength of
these identities at a given point in time. Indeed, rational
choice paradigms of ethnicity still assume the same inten-
sity of identity for each group, a problem especially evi-
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groups where each person is either a member of an ethnic
group or is not.69 What is evident in the story of the lost
counties is that, due to the overlapping nature of the Bun-
yoro heartland and the Bunyoro state in the pre-colonial
era, being Banyoro in Buddu and the eastern lost counties
was quite different from being Banyoro in Buyaga and
Bugangaizi, and that these differences had noticeable and
profound consequences. Any attempt to code ethnicity in
early colonial Uganda in a data set would have missed this
varying intensity and would have therefore been unable to
predict the differing outcomes of the lost counties over
the course of the twentieth century.
Second, the Ugandan case suggests that even the stron-
gest states are limited in their ability to effect ethnic change,
and that this failure can have significant political out-
comes. Not only was the Ugandan state unable to pro-
mote assimilation in Buyaga and Bugangaizi but, in the
words of Governor Crawford in 1959, “if the problem of
the ‘lost counties’ is not settled before Uganda becomes
self-governing it could easily lead to early disruption of
the new self-governing state, or even to civil war.”70 In
effect Crawford’s prediction was correct, as the transfer of
the lost counties back to Bunyoro in the 1964 referendum
led directly to the breakup of the two-party political coali-
tion governing Uganda up to that point and indirectly to
Milton Obote’s palace coup d’etat of 1966. Indeed, the
failure of the 1964 referendum to redistribute land own-
ership from absentee Baganda landlords to local Banyoro
residents has led more recently to brutal inter-ethnic clashes
over land in the two lost counties and the deployment of
riot police to contain the violence after elections in 2002
and 2006;71 the claim among many Banyoro residents
that internal migrants from elsewhere in Uganda have no
right to land in the counties is reminiscent of Toft’s afore-
mentioned argument about the link between indivisible
territory and conflict.72
Both the failure of the Ugandan state to promote assim-
ilation as well as the long-lasting political consequences of
this failure thus contradict the assertion that the African
colonial state was able to “delineate the strategic contexts
in which ethnicity was or was not salient” and thereby
“mould the choices of political actors with regard to both
ascriptive markers of ethnicity and the organizational forms
in which it was expressed.”73 Far from having the “excep-
tional capacity . . . to impose its own images of society” as
regards ethnicity,74 the Protectorate state was unable to
overcome the strength of pre-colonial ethnic identities in
the lost counties. Certainly one lesson here would be that
scholars attempting to account for ethnic change in the
modern world ignore the pre-modern world at their peril.
Indeed, as demonstrated by Anthony Smith and his “eth-
nosymbolist” school of nationalism studies, modern states
have had problems forging national identities without a
substantial collection of pre-modern ethnic myths and
memories from which to draw upon.75
One could respond here by arguing that, because it was
a large pre-colonial state, Bunyoro is exceptional and thus
the case of lost counties does not add much to our more
general understanding of ethnic change. Yet one should
not forget that there were several other states just in the
pre-colonial Great Lakes region, including Burundi, Kooki,
Nkore, Rwanda, and Toro, whose pre-colonial political
identities led directly to both a modern ethnic identity
and an ethnic homeland in the colonial era. While these
states may be exceptional in that they account for a minor-
ity of contemporary ethnic identities in the region, one
would be hard pressed to understand post-colonial con-
flicts in the Great Lakes region without some understand-
ing of these pre-colonial states, as Pierre Englebert has
demonstrated elsewhere for Sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole.76
Third and finally, the Ugandan case study suggests that
assimilation policies may need to be reconceived. If the
colonial Ugandan state, with its great coercive power and
frail civil society, could not enforce assimilation in the lost
counties, where and when should we expect modern dem-
ocratic states, with much less coercive power over their
citizens and much more strongly organized civil societies,
to promote assimilation successfully? Certainly the lesson
here is that the presence of an ethnic homeland can make
assimilation that much more difficult, as seen with the
various failed attempts at assimilating the native inhabit-
ants of Australia, Canada, and the United States, among
others. Indeed, as noted by various scholars, Native Amer-
icans have both clung onto an identification with their
own ethnic homelands while also resisting assimilation,77
as have, in a more notorious fashion, the “stolen genera-
tions” of aboriginal children in Australia who were forc-
ibly removed from their families and brought up as white
Australians up until 1969.78 The importance of an ethnic
homeland in resisting assimilation also arguably underlies
the recent attempt among American anti-immigration
activists to popularize what they call reconquista theory,
where the ultimate goal of Mexican immigrants is to reclaim
their own “lost” territories in the south-western United
States.79 Despite the very dubious evidence behind this
theory, it is clear that belief in it is both genuine and based
in part on a worry that Mexicans might claim part of the
United States as their homeland and therefore refuse to
assimilate. Certainly the Ugandan case study presented
here suggests that the presence of an ethnic homeland can
significantly affect the success of assimilation policies
amongst ethnic minorities, while ethnic minorities who
do not live in what they consider to be their homeland—
whether the Banyarwanda in colonial Uganda or contem-
porary immigrants to the United States—should be much
easier to assimilate than those who do.
In the end the experience of the lost counties points to
the need to formulate a more coherent and exact theory
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constructivist advances made in the study of ethnicity
have helped us to understand better how, when, and why
ethnic identities change; what is also necessary is to under-
stand where these identities do and do not change and
the underlying reasons for these differences. Hopefully
the Ugandan evidence presented here will move us fur-
ther along this path.
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